The Institute of Political Studies and Social Capital (IPSSC) in Chernivtsi has published the results of the research project “Social Barometer – 2025. Romanians in Ukraine in the Fourth Year of War”, financed by the Department for Romanians Abroad.
A project continuing long-term research
The Social Barometer continues a monitoring effort launched by IPSSC as early as 2022, aimed at capturing changes in mood, perceptions, and resilience mechanisms among Romanians in Ukraine. The research combines quantitative and qualitative methods: a public opinion survey conducted on a representative sample of 700 respondents (between 30 September and 7 October 2025) and three focus-group interviews held in the regions of Chernivtsi, Odesa, and Transcarpathia (26–29 September 2025).
The survey used a mixed data-collection method, combining online platforms and telephone interviews, based on a single standardized questionnaire.
The project was coordinated by Marin Gherman, Director of IPSSC and Senior Lecturer, PhD, at “Ștefan cel Mare” University of Suceava, and carried out by the institute’s research team (Sergiu Barbuța, Caterina Magas, among others). The full results of the study are available in a brochure published by IPSSC, also accessible online.
The impact of war: between solidarity and fatigue
After four years of armed conflict, Romanian communities in the three regions are experiencing a state of widespread exhaustion. Nearly seven out of ten respondents (69.1%) have relatives who have left the country, while a similar share (70.4%) have close family members mobilized at the front. Almost 40% of respondents have lost loved ones, turning the war into a deeply personal and painful experience.
Focus-group testimonies describe a life suspended between fear and the desire for normalcy: abandoned villages, schools with shrinking numbers of pupils, fragmented families, and men hiding to avoid mobilization. In the Odesa region, participants noted that “half the houses are empty,” while in Transcarpathia villages were described as places “where only the elderly have remained.”
War fatigue—described as strong by 44% of respondents and very strong by 20%—reflects not only psychological exhaustion but also a feeling of “life on hold,” where people live in the present without being able to plan for the future.
If in 2022 mutual aid and hope for a rapid end to the war prevailed, by 2025 there is a visible retreat into the private sphere. Mobilization has been replaced by silence, as people conserve their energy for survival.
Depopulation and migration
Two thirds of respondents (66.7%) identified the migration of relatives and friends as one of the main problems facing their communities, while one quarter (25.9%) stated that they themselves had been forced to leave—temporarily or permanently—because of the war. The phenomenon goes beyond statistics: it reshapes the very structure of communities, transforming villages from living spaces into places of memory.
In southern Bessarabia, a teacher reported that “if in 2020 the school had over 200 pupils, today there are only 151, and some classes have been closed.” In Transcarpathia, participants spoke of “elderly people left alone,” while in Chernivtsi one respondent summarized the situation by saying that “the Romanian village is alive, but it no longer breathes as it once did.”
Participants from the Odesa region described dramatic transformations linked to the absence of men: “The village has been left without men; if a fire breaks out, there is no one to put it out.” Cases of mobilization were cited—tractor drivers taken off the road, drivers detained unexpectedly—deepening the sense of insecurity. Depopulation thus means not only a numerical decline but also the loss of social balance and natural demographic distribution.
Economic migration that began long before 2022 has turned into migration for survival. Families have fragmented, and many of those who left abroad no longer intend to return. In Transcarpathia, a participant remarked bitterly: “If the war does not end soon, those who left will not come back, and the villages will slowly disappear.”
Education in Romanian – the core of identity
For Romanians in Ukraine, education is not merely a formative process but a means of cultural survival. According to the survey, over one third of respondents (35.8%) consider access to education in Romanian to be poor or very poor, while nearly 70% report a reduction in Romanian-language teaching hours. Other frequent problems include the migration of teachers and pupils, lack of textbooks, and administrative pressures.
In Chernivtsi, parents and teachers describe a rapid shift toward instruction in Ukrainian, perceived as a process of gradual assimilation. In Odesa, secondary education reform threatens the existence of Romanian-language schools in rural areas, while in Transcarpathia the shortage of teachers is critical. “If there is even one pupil left, they have the right to education in their mother tongue,” a teacher stated during focus-group discussions.
Nevertheless, Romanian continues to be spoken within families: 93.8% of respondents use it daily at home. This figure shows that identity persists in the private sphere, even as public space contracts. Family and church have taken on the role of guardians of the language.
Scholarships – a bridge and a sign of recognition
A separate chapter concerns perceptions of scholarships offered by Romania, which have been suspended for almost two years for Romanian pupils and students in Ukraine. Eighty-two percent of respondents say that scholarships represent real support for preserving language and identity, while 68% state that their suspension has seriously affected young people’s morale and motivation. “The suspension of scholarships was a blow—precisely now, when things are hardest”; “they were a sign that Romania had not forgotten us.”
IPSSC notes that scholarships also functioned as a mechanism of symbolic belonging, strengthening ties with Romania and conferring social prestige on beneficiaries. In their absence, feelings of isolation and abandonment have increased.
Religion and spiritual life
Over 90% of respondents attend religious services regularly or occasionally, and half believe that the church plays a crucial role in preserving identity. In times of crisis, faith has served as a moral refuge. In the Chernivtsi region, confessional tensions have created uncertainty, yet people continue to gather around the church. In Odesa, local clergy have become centers of assistance and consolation, while in Transcarpathia the church is perceived as a stable spiritual landmark.
More than 60% of participants clearly expressed a desire for official recognition of the Romanian Orthodox Church, viewing it as a legitimate form of identity protection.
Regarding the reasons why Ukrainian authorities have not officially registered the Romanian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, respondents emphasized political and administrative obstacles. Over 60% cited political barriers at the level of Ukrainian authorities; 34.6% believed that the Romanian state has not provided sufficient diplomatic support; 33.3% pointed to opposition from the Orthodox Church of Ukraine; and 37% mentioned a lack of initiative or public information among parishioners. Only a small share referred to external—primarily Russian—influences (12.3%) or an unclear legislative framework (19.8%).
Perceptions regarding ties between churches under Metropolitan Onufriy and political leadership in Moscow are divided: 45.7% believe no such connection exists, 22.2% believe it does, and 19.8% think such links exist in certain cases but are not general.
Identity, youth, and the media
Young people are the segment most exposed to cultural change and assimilation. Although survey data show that most express a desire to preserve their ethnic identity, discussions reveal a tendency toward distancing, especially under the influence of digital environments. Teachers and parents observe that young people use Romanian less in online communication, while the lack of modern content in the mother tongue encourages a shift toward Ukrainian or even Russian.
Almost half of respondents pointed to the lack of youth programs and the absence of Romanian-language media. As a result, identity is reproduced less through modern cultural forms and remains dependent on tradition and family. Without active educational and media institutions, the sense of ethnic and linguistic belonging risks dilution among future generations.
Relations with Romania and the European Union
Assessments of Romania’s support for the Romanian community in Ukraine are predominantly moderate. About one third of respondents (28.4%) rate it as medium, while 22.2% consider it high. At the same time, nearly one third (28%) evaluate the support as weak or very weak.
By comparison, Romania’s support for Ukraine as a whole is perceived far more favorably: almost half (49.4%) rate it as very good, and 30.9% as good. The gap between these perceptions highlights a discrepancy between geopolitical involvement and identity-based support: Romania is seen as a firm ally of Ukraine, but less present in concretely supporting its own community.
Nevertheless, Romania continues to be perceived as the main external supporter of the Romanian community in Ukraine. Scholarships, humanitarian aid, cultural projects, and cross-border contacts are viewed as tangible signs of support, yet communities expect consistent, strategically structured involvement. Support for Ukraine is not perceived as a guarantee of improved conditions or image for the Romanian minority.
The European Union is viewed primarily through the lens of democratic values and minority protection standards. Respondents believe that Ukraine’s accession to the EU could open the way to genuine protection of cultural diversity, offering a more stable legal framework for preserving Romanian language and identity. Romania is seen as a bridge between the community and Europe—a natural intermediary capable of translating European principles into concrete minority policies.
At the same time, a certain pessimism is evident. Many do not perceive EU integration as an immediate change, but rather as a distant hope. “Europe is far away; we have the war here,” said a participant from the Odesa region, capturing the general sentiment that promised transformations will not occur soon and that, until then, communities must rely on their own resources.
Conclusions and recommendations
The Romanian community in Ukraine demonstrates a remarkable capacity for cultural survival. It lives between exhaustion and hope, between daily fear and the desire for normalcy. For Romania, the research confirms the need for a consistent and predictable support policy. Assistance can no longer be symbolic or occasional; it must be integrated into a well-articulated strategy with long-term objectives.
Education in the mother tongue remains the central pillar. A permanent fund should be established to support Romanian-language schools in Ukraine, covering textbooks, scholarships, teacher training programs, and professional development recognized by Ukrainian authorities. Teachers in the Chernivtsi, Odesa, and Transcarpathia regions emphasized the need for institutional cooperation that offers professional recognition and sustained support.
Romania should also strengthen its cross-border cultural network through joint youth programs, summer camps, festivals, and Romanian-language media platforms. Focus-group discussions clearly show that young people feel the absence of modern cultural content in their mother tongue; therefore, investments in digital media—podcasts, educational series, short video content—are crucial for preserving Romanian language use.
Cultural diplomacy must become more applied. Romania has an important intermediary role between the European Union and Romanian communities in Ukraine. This requires real coordination among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Department for Romanians Abroad, and the Ministry of Education, aimed at creating a unified monitoring and support mechanism. This is not about occasional grants, but about an institutional infrastructure ensuring continuity and coherence.
Special attention must be paid to religious life. In all analyzed regions, the church functions not only as a place of worship but also as a social hub. Romania should support—diplomatically and politically—the official recognition of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, assist in clergy training in Romanian, and ensure access to liturgical materials. In many localities, the church is the only institution that still brings people together and offers community stability.
In education, Romania could initiate, together with Ukraine and European partners, cross-border mobility programs allowing pupils from Romanian-language schools to participate in joint activities with pupils in Romania, university visits, and short-term scholarships. At the same time, higher education in Romania should be encouraged for young people from historical regions, with incentives for graduates to return and contribute to their communities.
Culturally, support should focus on local infrastructure—community centers, libraries, art workshops, and publications. Qualitative data show that many such spaces have degraded or disappeared. Their rehabilitation would restore a sense of normalcy and dignity. Cultural projects should move beyond festive rhetoric and foster genuine participation: training young artists, translations, contemporary creation, and digital journalism.
For Ukraine, recommendations include strengthening European standards on national minority rights. Ukrainian authorities must ensure real access to education in Romanian, not only by maintaining existing schools but also by reopening closed classes or institutions where there is demand. New textbooks, teacher training, and recognition of qualifications obtained in Romania should become governmental priorities.
Ukraine also bears responsibility for protecting religious pluralism. Official recognition of the Romanian Orthodox Church and guaranteeing believers the right to worship in their mother tongue would be gestures of trust and reconciliation. In a war context, such measures not only meet European norms but also contribute to internal social stability by reducing ethnic and confessional tensions.
Finally, regarding rural development policies, Ukrainian authorities should include regions with Romanian populations in special economic revitalization programs. Depopulation, lack of infrastructure, and absence of jobs are systemic problems requiring coordinated solutions. Joint Romanian–Ukrainian projects funded by European sources could target school rehabilitation, administrative digitalization, cultural heritage preservation, and tourism development.